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Abstract 
Carbon sequestration in plantation forests provides the main means by 
which New Zealand will meet its international climate change obligations in the 
first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008–2012). However, without 
active policy, forests are unlikely to contribute as much in subsequent 
commitment periods. This research paper provides the background for examining 
policy measures for encouraging carbon sequestration in plantation forests in 
New  Zealand. Part I focuses on providing factual information and positive 
analysis of: key domestic and international regulations; information on 
New Zealand forests, the forestry industry and forest profitability; discussion of 
land-use decision making, including the central question of what influences 
conversion of farmland to forestry; and forest carbon ecology. Part II moves on to 
normative analysis of policy design. It discusses how including considerations of 
the value of carbon sequestration and storage changes optimal land-use behaviour, 
and outlines key issues that need to be addressed when developing a policy to 
encourage sequestration and storage in a pragmatic way. Finally, the paper 
identifies a number of key areas where we need more information before we can 
make well-informed choices about policy design. Future work will endeavour to 
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PART I: Context  
1 Introduction 
In New  Zealand, climate change policy is an active area of policy 
debate. It is likely that it will be difficult for New Zealand to significantly reduce 
its energy-related emissions over the next decade. Along with this, the prospects 
for reducing New  Zealand’s agricultural emissions are dependent on research, 
which is at an early stage. In this context, it is important that New Zealand makes 
the most of its capacity to sequester carbon in growing forests, even if forest 
carbon sequestration only "buys time" rather than providing a long-term solution 
to the global climate change problem. New Zealand’s capacity for sequestering 
carbon is large compared with that of other countries. Even with no sequestration 
policy, sequestration in new forests is expected to roughly offset all greenhouse 
gas emission increases, including those from fossil fuels and ruminant methane, 
during the first commitment period 2008–2012.
1 
At the global level, human responses to observed and expected climate 
change include two international agreements directly addressing the climate 
change threat. New Zealand signed the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 and its subsidiary agreement, the Kyoto 
Protocol, in 1998. In December 2002 the Government ratified the Protocol. It will 
come into force internationally if Russia ratifies it. In late 2002 the Government 
announced a climate change policy package to accompany the Kyoto Protocol. 
Policies on carbon sequestration are an important part of New Zealand’s package.  
Within this context, we seek in this research paper to provide the 
background for examining policy measures for carbon sequestration in plantation 
forests in New Zealand. This paper is aimed primarily at New Zealand policy and 
scientific advisers reviewing and developing carbon sequestration policy in 
                                                             
1 The US, which has large sinks relative to most countries, reported to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change that in 2000 its sequestration from land-use change 
and forestry was around 1 million gigagrams of carbon dioxide, while overall net emissions were 
around 6 million gigagrams (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2001). 2 
New Zealand, stakeholders in the forestry industry, and those seeking to establish 
where further research needs to take place.  
This paper is the first step in a broader project. Our aim is to establish 
firm, common ground on the basic facts, the driving forces that any policy aims to 
affect, and the tradeoffs involved in any policy design. We are developing this 
paper together with key people in industry, government officials, forestry 
consultants and researchers, but they are not responsible for the views or facts 
presented here. We do not discuss specific policy designs in this paper, since we 
wish to illuminate the underlying issues rather than enter policy debate. Our hope 
is that our process will ultimately enable policy discussion to be more productive 
by building understanding of different groups’ concerns and interests, building a 
consensus to exclude policies that are likely to be ineffective or inefficient for 
objective technical reasons, and setting out a series of feasible policy options that 
might not be currently on the table but might have benefits for all Parties. This 
should allow the political discussion to focus on truly political issues, such as the 
allocation of costs and benefits.  
While we develop this paper, we are also building an empirical model 
of New Zealand land use that includes a significant forestry component while also 
incorporating ruminant agriculture. This is a five-year project funded by the 
Foundation for Research, Science and Technology, and we are now in our second 
year. The modelling should provide more information on the relative importance 
of different factors and illustrate the likely effects of different policies. It is not 
intended to be an accurate model for prediction but rather a useful tool for 
exploring policy. When the model is functioning well, we plan to bring our 
"qualitative" discussion process together with the modelling process so they can 
complement each other and yield deeper, more robust insights into appropriate 
design and the likely effect of policies.  
This paper is focused on the growing and harvesting of trees—i.e., it 
does not directly address other aspects of forestry, such as wood processing. It 
also excludes indigenous forest policy and conservation-oriented activities, which 
form important elements of the wider forestry picture. There is also considerable 
potential for carbon sequestration outside plantations—e.g. from reversion of 3 
grassland or scrub to indigenous "permanent protection" forest (non-harvest)—but 
that topic is not covered in this paper.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. Part I focuses on providing 
factual information and analysis of: key domestic and international regulations; 
New  Zealand forests, the forestry industry and forest profitability; land-use 
decision making, including the central question of what influences conversion of 
farmland to forestry; and forest carbon ecology. Part II moves on to normative 
analysis of policy design. Section 6 discusses how including considerations of the 
value of carbon sequestration and storage changes optimal land use behaviour. 
Sections 7 and 8 outline key issues that need to be addressed when developing a 
policy to encourage sequestration and storage in a pragmatic way. Future work 
will endeavour to identify and evaluate policies that would effectively encourage 
sequestration.  
2 Existing  regulations 
2.1 Relevant  international rules 
Parties to the UNFCCC, including New  Zealand, are committed to 
promoting conservation and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse 
gases, including forests and other terrestrial, coastal and marine ecosystems. 
New  Zealand has also ratified the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, and this 
requires Parties to report on sinks and sources of greenhouse gases and meet 
defined emissions limitation commitments. Only a specified subset of the sinks 
and sources reported are accounted for in determining whether a party has met its 
commitments. New  Zealand will be given "credit" for carbon sequestration in 
forests established since 1990 and is liable for any "deforestation" (transformation 
of forested land to a non-forest land use). 
2.1.1  Article 3.3—carbon sequestered/lost through changes in forest 
area 
Article 3.3 of the Protocol makes a distinction between forests planted 
before 1990 (non-Kyoto forests) and those planted after 1990 on previously 4 
unforested land (Kyoto forests).
2 Any subsequent net change in Kyoto forests 
from direct human-induced activities must be accounted for in each commitment 
period. Kyoto forests earn "credits" for carbon sequestered (the carbon stock 
change) during the first commitment period, and potentially during subsequent 
periods. If credits have been earned from a forest in one commitment period, later 
carbon releases from this forest (e.g. when the forest is harvested) will result in 
"debits".
3  
Article 3.3 also means that New Zealand is liable for deforestation of 
non-Kyoto forests where "deforestation" is defined as land-use conversion to a 
non-forestry use such as dairy production. If non-Kyoto forest is harvested and 
replanted within an allowed period, no debit liability will be imposed.  
New  Zealand is expected to generate a significant number of 
sequestration credits, about 105 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent, 
under Article 3.3 in the first commitment period (2008–2012), since the land area 
devoted to forests in New Zealand has increased considerably since 1990.
4 These 
will roughly offset increases in emissions from fossil fuels and ruminant methane 
in the first commitment period.  
2.1.2  Article 3.4—carbon sequestration through changes in forest 
management 
New Zealand has signalled that it is unlikely to elect to include forest 
management under Article 3.4 of the Protocol as an eligible activity in the first 
commitment period. This is for two reasons. First, New  Zealand does not 
currently have the detailed scientific information required in respect of the total 
forest estate, and the ability to acquire this information is also questionable.
5 
Second, it is expected that accounting for this article in the first commitment 
                                                             
2 The definition of a "forest" is critical for indigenous reversion, though less so for plantation 
forest, which probably fits most reasonable definitions. The government has chosen to define it as 
an area of at least 1ha, with at least 30% canopy cover and with trees that are able to reach a height 
of 5m at maturity in situ (New Zealand Climate Change Project, 2002, p. 42). 
3 A fine detail in the agreement, aimed at New Zealand’s special situation, ensures that Kyoto 
forests that are harvested during the first commitment period will not incur debits for harvesting 
that exceed the credits they gained during the period. This does not affect other countries because 
their forests will not be mature enough to harvest by 2012. 
4 New Zealand Climate Change Project (2002), p. 8.  
5 New Zealand Climate Change Programme (2001), p. 33.  5 
period would result in a net debit for New  Zealand rather than the award of 
additional credits.  
With New Zealand’s provisional decision not to elect to use Article 3.4, 
any changes (except deforestation) in the forests that were present in 1990 are 
excluded from the international accounting system, at least for the first 
commitment period. This does not imply that no action should be taken with 
respect to such forests, but that matter is beyond the scope of this paper.  
2.1.3  Article 17—international trading of emissions 
Article 17 of the Protocol allows for the international trading of 
emissions—the exchange of assigned amount units (AAUs)—between Parties to 
the Protocol. All removal units (RMUs) from land-use change and forestry 
(LUCF) activities, emission reduction units (ERUs) from Joint Implementation 
projects (Article 6), and certified emission reduction (CER) units from the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) (Article 12, relevant for projects in developing 
countries), are in principle fully fungible (exchangeable) with AAUs.
6 They are all 
measured in terms of tonnes of CO2-equivalent. This provision means, for 
example, that the New Zealand government, or its legally designated entities if it 
chooses to devolve credits, may sell RMUs created by sequestration in 
New Zealand to another country Party such as Japan.  
The international rules for both Articles 3.3 and 3.4 have been 
essentially set for the first commitment period but these may change in subsequent 
commitment periods, or under an alternative international regime if Kyoto is 
replaced. This contributes to uncertainty concerning the role of land use and land-
use change in the Kyoto Protocol. This uncertainty makes it more difficult to 
resolve issues of design and implementation of policy for carbon sequestration in 
New Zealand plantation forests. 
                                                             
6 There are some limitations on trading. For example, the "commitment period reserve" is the 
requirement that each Annex I Party must maintain in its national registry either 90% of its initial 
assigned amount or 100% of five times its most recently reviewed inventory, whichever is lower. 
The commitment period reserve is intended to guard against overselling by Annex I Parties. When 
this is binding, the only trading that can occur is under Article 6, Joint Implementation. This could 
be binding in the early years in the New Zealand case (United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, 2001, pp. 4–5). 6 
2.2  Current New Zealand government policy 
2.2.1  Climate change policy on plantation forests 
The two key elements of current New Zealand climate change policy as 
it relates to carbon sequestration in plantation forests are: 
•  The decision that the Government will retain ownership of the sink 
credits for the period 2008–2012, announced in October 2002.  
The government will retain “the sink credits and associated liabilities 
allocated to New Zealand under the Kyoto Protocol in recognition of 
the carbon sink value of post-1990 forest plantings. These credits will 
be retained and managed by the government, at least for the first 
commitment period”.
 7  
•  The development of a "Forestry Industry Framework Agreement" 
(FIFA). 
The government also announced in 2002, “In recognition of the forest 
sector's role in creating the sink credits, the Government agreed to develop a 
’Forestry Industry Framework Agreement’ with the sector”.
8 The agreement 
includes forestry sector investment initiatives and policy on forest sink credits.  
In the 2004 Budget round, the FIFA agreement was consolidated with 
the announcement of a five-year package of forestry sector initiatives, further 
detailing of the government’s forest sink credit policy, and the announcement of 
additional initiatives that will be considered if the Kyoto Protocol comes into 
force.
9  
The five-year package includes: a $12 million regional and industry 
market development programme; a $2.8 million bioenergy programme; a $5 
million investment in industry labour and skills; and $1.4 million to assist 
international market access. The regional development transport funding package 
is a related investment, and forecasts investment of $23 million per annum until at 
                                                             
7 “Sink credits,” 2004. 
8 “Sink credits,” 2004. 
9 Funding for the package is contingent on signing of the FIFA Memorandum of Understanding.  7 
least 2007/8. Roading upgrades in forestry areas in Northland and Tairawhiti are a 
high priority of the package. 
Government policy on forest sink liabilities has been further detailed to 
state that, for those forests where the government retains sink credits, the 
government will accept full liability for deforestation or harvesting of Kyoto 
forests. For non-Kyoto forests, the government will assume liability for 
deforestation up to a cap of 21 million tonnes of emission units over the period 
2008–2012.
10 If Kyoto forest sink credits are devolved after commitment period 
one, liabilities will also be devolved in proportion. 
The Wood Processing Strategy, which was established in 2001 and is 
closely related to the broader FIFA agreement, continues to evolve along with it. 
It seeks to create closer working relationships between industry and government, 
and to “develop and implement the strategic framework to ensure the long-term 
sustainability of the forestry industry through value-added processing”.
11  
Initiatives under FIFA reflect increasing awareness that levels of carbon 
sequestration, and rates of new planting and replanting, are strongly tied with 
forestry industry profitability. However, with no direct mechanisms having yet 
been created to encourage the planting of harvestable forest, and the decision not 
to devolve credits to forest owners in commitment period oneclimate change 
policy does not provide any direct mechanisms to encourage growth in the total 
plantation forest estate. 
2.2.2  Other forestry-related climate change policies 
 "Negotiated Greenhouse Agreements” (NGAs) for competitiveness-at-
risk firms are another government climate change policy initiative. Under an 
NGA, a firm would reduce its emissions intensity to World’s Best Practice levels 
in exchange for either a partial or full exemption from the emissions charge. As of 
June 2004, one NGA has been concluded, and a further 12 applications to 
                                                             
10 Hodgson (2004a), p. 3. 
11 Industry New Zealand (2002), p. 3. 8 
negotiate have been received, with six currently under negotiation.
12 Two of the 
six applications under negotiation are from forestry processing companies.
 13 
The "permanent forest sink mechanism" may also have an effect on 
plantation forestry. The permanent forest sink mechanism will award Kyoto forest 
landowners for carbon sequestration, subject to the landowner covenanting the 
forest for permanent protection. Under the mechanism, landowners will be 
allocated tradable emission units equal to the amount of increased carbon stored in 
the forest over commitment period one. Entry into the scheme requires a contract 
to be signed between the landowner and the Crown. Contracts will be registered 
against land titles and run with the land, and bind all future landowners. The 
initial proposed mechanism (as at October 2002) required a commitment not to 
harvest for commercial gain. However, in the May 2004 budget this rule was 
revised to allow landowners some harvest of the forest after 35 years, subject to 
the constraint that continuous canopy cover is maintained, and landowners are 
responsible for any carbon emission liabilities that may arise.
14, 15 
Penalties will be incurred for deliberate breaching of harvesting 
allowances. These will require the landowner to “replace all credits received plus 
additional units calculated on the basis of an annual compounding rate of 10 
percent, applied to each year’s sequestration, commencing from the earliest year 
in which the forest sequestered carbon in respect of which units were 
generated”.
16 Arrangements for "replacing" units are to be agreed upon during 
contract negotiation. The penalty will apply to any deliberate harvesting before 
the 35-year period, and to any over-harvest after the 35 years. If carbon is lost 
through non-deliberate harvest, e.g. fire, disease, or windthrow, landowners will 
incur liabilities in proportion to the amount of carbon released, but with no 
additional penalty payment.  
                                                             
12 “Negotiated Greenhouse Agreements,” 2004. 
13 As at March 2004, the government is in negotiation with Carter Holt Harvey's key 
manufacturing operations and Norse Skog Tasman (“Negotiated Greenhouse Agreements,” 2004).  
14 Hodgson, 2004b. 
15 The definition of "continuous canopy cover" is under development as at June 2004, but will 
generally require a continuous canopy cover over the ground at any point in time. Implicitly there 
is a disincentive to over-harvest to avoid incurring liabilities. 
16 The Chair, Cabinet Policy Committee (2003), p. 4. 9 
The mechanism does allow for the possibility of exiting the scheme 
through negotiation under the contract. Exit will require the mutual consent of the 
Parties and full repayment of carbon credits earned, and penalties will be incurred 
if harvesting is carried out. The mechanism also allows for land-use change out of 
forestry. Landowners will be able to change land use at any time, with the 
requirement that trees cut down (that exceed the allowable harvest) will not be 
able to be sold for commercial gain. Landowners will also be required to replace 
emission units for re-released carbon.
17 
The proposed Permanent Forest Sink Mechanism is probably not 
directly relevant to the forestry industry. It is unlikely to compete with growing 
forest for harvest, unless the price of carbon relative to wood rises, and is most 
likely to affect marginal land.  
A further government climate change mechanism, the Projects to 
Reduce Emissions Mechanism, has the potential to affect forestry e.g. through 
funding of bioenergy projects. However, forest sink projects have been excluded 
from it at this stage. The mechanism is designed to provide incentives to generate 
emission reductions that go beyond business-as-usual.  
Other forestry protection mechanisms, such as the QEII National Trust 
and Nga Whenua Rahui, continue to operate. However, these mechanisms do not 
affect commercial forestry.  
2.2.3  Resource Management Act (RMA) 
The RMA is a key part of New  Zealand’s regulatory framework 
affecting land-use decisions, both nationally and at a local government level. 
Under the RMA, councils are required to promote the sustainable management of 
natural and physical resources, including water and soil. Interpretations of the 
implications of this objective vary by local authority, as do relevant ecological 
considerations such as the resilience of land resources (e.g. erodibility) and 
conditions such as climate variability. Whether a forester can get consent to 
harvest on steep land is often discretionary. In some regions, local conditions are 
                                                             
17 Indigenous Forestry Unit (2004).  10 
judged to necessitate fairly strict regulation of forestry activity, or restrictions on 
putting land into forestry. For example, Environment Canterbury’s draft Natural 
Resources Regional Plan 2003 proposes to restrict change from pasture to 
plantation forest, in view of concerns about afforestation reducing stream flows.
18 
In addition, how local authorities implement the RMA affects the speed and cost 
for forest owners of gaining consents for forest planting and harvest. Uncertainty 
as to conditions surrounding consents can influence investment decisions. It is 
widely commented in the forestry industry that the RMA is an impediment to 
investment in the sector. 
Amendments have recently been made to the RMA, and it remains 
under review. Amendments in the Resource Management (Energy and Climate 
Change) Amendment Act 2004 (which came into effect on 2 March 2004) require 
exercisers of the Act to have particular regard to the effects of climate change, and 
require local authorities “to plan for the effects of climate change, but not to 
consider the effects on climate change of discharges into air of greenhouse 
gases”.
19 The amended Act aims for a national management approach on 
controlling greenhouse gas emissions. It also recognises the need to consider 
climate change and energy matters when planning and making decisions on 
resource management issues. These amendments tend to focus on methods to 
adapt to climate change. 
The current review is focused on achieving an effective balance 
between national and local interests within the Act, streamlining the design and 
process of local policy formulation, and improving the consent decision-making 
process.
20 This involves consideration of the extent to which central government 
should, and is able to, give national direction on resource management matters 
that affect climate change. 
The recent amendment to, and current review of, the RMA recognise 
the potential for inconsistent treatment of climate change across local and regional 
                                                             
18 Environment Canterbury (2003).  
19 New Zealand 2004, No. 2, Part 1, Section 3. 
20 “Focus of the 2004 RMA review programme,” 2004. 11 
councils, current lack of certainty on climate change issues within the RMA, and 
the transboundary nature of climate change impacts.  
2.2.4 Taxation  rules  affecting forestry 
Forest planting costs can be deducted from and thus "shelter" other 
income, and this can be attractive to farmers wishing to smooth their tax 
payments. However, while the cost incurred in investing in a new forest can be 
deducted for tax purposes, the cost incurred in the purchase of an existing but 
immature forest cannot be deducted against other income—it is held in a "cost of 
bush" account until income is earned from harvest. Whether or not the former is 
"advantageous" in tax terms, it is clear that the regime is not neutral between 
buying a forest and planting one—it favours planting over purchase. 
3  New Zealand’s forestry industry 
In this section we highlight key plantation forestry trends, with an eye 
to forestry’s sequestration potential. In particular we want to understand what 
types of actors are likely to be able to effectively and efficiently sequester more 
carbon (or protect existing carbon stores) and what drives their behaviour. Policy 
needs to be directed at these groups in effective ways. We also want to establish 
the magnitudes of the key variables: levels and changes in forest, and amounts of 
carbon sequestered in New  Zealand forests. Also, for distributional and equity 
reasons, we want to understand who is likely to be affected by any policy aimed at 
carbon sequestration. This section of the paper provides initial discussion of these 
points. The ongoing five-year programme aims to provide a more thorough, 
empirically-based analysis. 
3.1  Basic forest facts: Areas, trends, ages 
Plantation forest covers around 7% (1.83 Mha) of New Zealand’s total 
land area of 27.1 Mha.
21 This compares with 44% in pastoral land and 23% in 
indigenous forest.
22 The National Exotic Forest Description (NEFD), which 
                                                             
21 Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (2004), p. 2. 
22 Pastoral land area was sourced from Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (2003b) and 
indigenous forest land area was sourced from “Land cover database, land cover for New Zealand” 
(1997). 12 
provides a profile of age classes, shows that planting has been unusually high 
since 1990. These are forests under 12 years in age in Figure 1 (this includes both 
restocking and planting newly established forests). If radiata forests are on 
average harvested at around 27 years in age, a large area will be harvested over 
the next 12 years (termed the "wall of wood"), but the harvesting demands in 
around 20 years will be higher still. As forest is harvested, owners need to make 
the decision about whether to replant. If this land has alternative uses, these are 
key decision points for potential deforestation.  
Forest owners have considerable flexibility to adjust the age at harvest 
depending on market conditions, subject to some constraints from cash flow 
requirements. However, the annual increment in wood quantity gradually falls as 
rotation length is extended, and owners are likely to weigh the increment in wood 
value from another year’s physical growth, together with the likelihood of an 
increase/decrease in wood prices, against prevailing market interest rates.
23 The 
area-weighted average clear-fell age for radiata pine (which is 89% of plantation 
forest area) was 27 years at April 2001, and 27.4 years in 2002.
24 With Douglas fir 
(6% of plantation forest area), other exotic softwoods (2%) and exotic hardwoods 
(3%), rotation length is typically longer (e.g. for Douglas fir usually ranging 
between 40 and 60 years), with more variation emerging in harvesting age.  
                                                             
23 Current annual increment of volume peaks at about 21–23 years for radiata pine under typical 
NZ conditions and remains at very high levels for another 10–15 years (personal communication, 
Piers Maclaren). 
24 New  Zealand Forest Owners Association, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and the 
New Zealand Forest Industries Council (2003), pp. 1 and 3. 13 
Figure 1: Total estimated planted production forest area, by age class (as at 
1 April 2002) 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (2003a).  
3.1.1  How much new forest has been planted since 1990? 
To gain an estimate of Kyoto forest, i.e. forest planted on unforested 
land (in other words, excluding restocking) since 1990, new planting data are 
used. Figure 2 (New land planted in production forest in New Zealand) shows that 
new planting rates in the early 1990s were at historic highs. It also shows that new 
planting rates have fallen since the early 1990s peak. New planting rates were at 
30,100ha in 2001, 22,100 in 2002, and 14,900 (provisionally) in 2003; these are 
well below the average afforestation rate for the last 30 years of 44,900 ha/yr.
25 
Because permanent deforestation rates are anecdotally said to be very low, the 
new planting rates also indicate the growth in the total forest estate. 
However, a problem with NEFD numbers is that new planting and 
restocking numbers are estimates rather than solid numbers. The new planting 
estimate is calculated from the total numbers of seedlings sold by commercial 
forest nurseries, as reported to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF). 
Restocking estimates are based on data collected from forest owners but, to the 
extent that some farm foresters do not respond to the survey, the estimate’s 
                                                             
25 Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (2004), p. 2. 14 
reliability is limited.
26 Without as yet a map of New Zealand land cover in 1990, 
afforestation since that date cannot be accurately estimated.  
Figure 2: New land planted in production forest in New Zealand 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (2003a). Existing baseline predictions of forest area.  
The rates of new plantation forest planting in New Zealand are highly 
variable, and consequently prediction is difficult. Current rates of new planting are 
estimated to range from 0–25,000ha/yr, with NEFD’s provisional estimate for 
2003 being 14,900 hectares. Farm forestry planting rates seem to have slowed 
down substantially in the last few years.
27 One farmer commented recently that 
“new plantings have declined steadily since 1996, as has membership of the NZ 
Farm Forestry Association, and there seems to be a widespread belief that forestry 
has little commercial value for farmers.”
28 Some forestry industry commentators 
consider current planting rates to be close to zero.  
Three of the range of possible explanations that have been offered to 
explain the drop in new planting rates are that existing forestry investors are 
concentrating on pruning and maintaining existing stands; that future returns to 
planting, as crudely indicated by current wood prices, are not sufficiently 
encouraging; and that new investors who might have established new forests have 
                                                             
26 The 2002 NEFD surveyed all forest owners and managers with at least 1000 hectares of planted 
production forest, and received a 100% response rate. Owners with less than 1000 hectares are 
surveyed every other year. Small-scale forest owners (1 to 39 ha) were last surveyed in the 1995 
Statistics New Zealand small forest grower survey. All of these areas are still present in the 2002 
NEFD database (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2003a, p. 8). 
27 Mike Halliday, personal communication, May 2003.  
28 Denis Hocking, personal communication, May 2003. 15 
been scared off by negative press about the forestry industry and New Zealand’s 
policies in relation to the Kyoto Protocol. A few foreign investors appear willing 
to plant despite the prospect of current relatively low rates of return because, it has 
been suggested, they see forestry investment as "green" and a risk management 
option.
29 A model of the mix of influences on new forest planting rates is 
presented in Section 4 below. 
In contrast to current estimates of new planting, the Forest Industries 
Council’s vision is for the planted area to expand from 1.8Mha to between 3.5 and 
4Mha by 2025.
30 The expansion realised will depend on the investment decisions 
of a range of public and private forestry companies and individuals. Discussion 
with forestry industry stakeholders indicates that while this vision remains 
achievable, it is strongly dependent on future investment levels, forestry 
profitability and the level of confidence in the industry. 
3.2  NZ forestry industry structure 
3.2.1 Forest  ownership 
3.2.1.a  Who owns current forests? 
The New Zealand plantation forest industry is more concentrated than 
dairy or sheep production, but less concentrated than forest processing. The 
largest six companies (Carter Holt Harvey, Harvard Management Company (who 
bought Central North Island Forest Partnership in October 2003), Weyerhauser 
New Zealand, Juken Nissho, and Ernslaw One) together own around 655,000ha, 
which is 36% of the total planted area.
31 All six are foreign-owned. Seventy-five 
forest owners have blocks that exceed 1,000ha, and together these companies and 
individuals owned 1.285Mha in 2003, or 70% of the total planted area. Put 
another way, small blocks (less than 1,000ha) comprised 30% of the total planted 
area.
32  
                                                             
29 Peter Clark, CE of P F Olsen, personal communication, May 2003. 
30 New  Zealand Forest Owners Association, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and the 
New Zealand Forest Industries Council (2003), p. 22. 
31 Tenon Ltd (previously Fletcher Challenge Forests) sold its entire forest estate to three buyers in 
2004. 
32 Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (2003a), p 20–21. 16 
Table 1 gives a breakdown of planted production forest ownership in 
five broad categories.  
Table 1: New Zealand forest ownership, as at 1 April 2003 
Ownership category 
1  Estimated total area 
(ha) 
Percentage of estimated 
total 
Registered public 
company  828 930  45% 
Privately owned 
2 852  418  47% 
State-owned enterprise   42 415  2% 
Local government  58 161  3% 
Central government 
3 45  415  3% 
New Zealand total  1 827 339  100% 
Notes: 
1. Ownership is based solely on the ownership of the forest irrespective of the ownership of the 
land. 
2. “Privately owned” includes all privately owned forests. The legal entities included in this 
category are private companies, partnerships, individuals and trusts, which include Māori trusts 
and incorporations.  
3. “Central government" forests are predominantly Crown owned forests on Māori lease hold land. 
These forests are managed by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (2004). 
 
3.2.1.b  Who owns Kyoto Forests? 
The picture of who owns Kyoto forests (as opposed to plantation forests 
in general) is not a clear one. MAF reports that between 1990 and 2002 “it is 
estimated that 640,000 hectares of forest have been established. New entrants to 
forestry have carried out much of this new planting. Accurate details of the 
ownership composition of these new entrants are not available. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the majority of these new owners are either private 
landowners or syndicate investors and that most of the forests established by these 
owners are small in size.”
33 While some anecdotal evidence collected in the 
writing of this paper supports MAF’s assessment of Kyoto forest ownership—i.e. 
                                                             
33 Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (2004), p. 2. 17 
that in the last decade, most planting has been carried out by farmers reforesting 
marginal blocks of land—other commentators perceive new planting to be 
roughly equally distributed between farm foresters, investment partnerships and 
small to medium-size companies.  
3.2.1.c  Land ownership vs. forest ownership 
Existing ownership arrangements, e.g. leases, forestry rights, and 
Crown Forest Licenses, allow the ownership of the forest to be legally separated 
from the ownership of the land. Where the forest owner and landowner are 
separate entities, as is true for a large amount of the plantation forest estate, 
complexities in policy design are introduced. Our incomplete data collection on 
land ownership and forest ownership of the plantation forest estate shows that for 
at least 37% of forested land, the landowner and forest owner are separate entities. 
And, for at least 21% of forested land, the landowner and forest owner are the 
same entity. For the remaining 42% of forested land, the relationship between the 
landowner and the forest owner is unknown.
34  
3.3  Forest prices and profitability 
To anticipate a key element of the model of land-use decision making 
provided in Section 4, the returns from forestry (especially relative to agricultural 
returns) are clearly an important influence on land use in New Zealand. Figure 3 
shows agricultural price indices from 1988 through 1995. In this period, the price 
index for forestry diverged from the other agricultural products’ indices. It rose as 
high as 40% above its 1986 level while the other prices remained near their 1986 
levels. Assuming no comparative change in costs, this suggests that forestry 
profitability rose relative to farm profitability during this period. From around 
1995, the forestry index converged with the other indices and has since followed a 
similar path, indicating that changes in forestry output prices have become more 
comparable to changes in prices in the other main agricultural sectors.  
                                                             
34 In these cases we may have information on either the landowner or the forest owner, but not 
both. Therefore for these pieces of forested land we cannot connect the forest owner with the 
landowner. 18 
Little time series data is available on forestry production costs. This 
data would enable a fuller picture of forestry profitability to be developed. 
However, forestry and logging production input price data for 1994 to 2000 
indicates that input prices were relatively steady over this period.
35  
                                                             
35 New Zealand Forestry Statistics (2000). 19 
Figure 3: Meat, skins and wool, dairy products and forestry products—
relative output price trends, 1986–2003 
Notes: 
Data is derived by taking an annual average of monthly data. 
The 2003 average is based on four months of data, January–April. 
“Meat, skins and wool” includes lamb, beef, wool, skins, and venison. 
“Dairy products” includes whole milk powder, skim milk powder, butter, cheese and casein. 
“Forestry products” includes sawn timber, logs, and wood pulp. 
Source: ANZ commodity price index—historical series and component indices. 
New Zealand is a small player in internationally traded forest products 
(at 1.1% of world forest products trade),
36 and is largely a price taker in the 
international forest product market. Major competitors in the pine wood market 
are Chile, Australia, Brazil and South Africa; our position is open to competition 
and is price sensitive. The profitability of the planted forest industry is thus 
substantially "exogenous" to the New Zealand industry’s actions, other than to its 
cost structure. Profitability movements are driven largely by international 
macroeconomic factors such as economic demand in the key markets of Australia, 
                                                             
36 New  Zealand Forest Owners Association, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and the 
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Japan, the US and South Korea. The parts of the New Zealand forestry industry 
that were producing and exporting unprocessed, unpruned logs were seriously 
affected by the Asian crisis, reducing prices in 1998. However, prices for pruned 
logs remained buoyant until somewhat later (early 1999).
37 
Costs of substitute material products such as steel, aluminium and 
concrete, and the costs of fossil fuel alternatives to wood, affect the demand for 
wood in the international market. Costs of product installation further influence 
costs. Evolving attitudes towards fossil fuel use and its effects on climate change 
are also of significance. In the longer term, concerns about climate change may 
mean that fossil fuel use will turn down in favour of demand for wood both as a 
fuel source and as a solid wood product. However, even if this does not eventuate, 
growing population and incomes are likely to increase wood demand over time.
38 
To maintain its market position and minimise future demand-side risks, 
New  Zealand forestry operations have been moving to consolidate market 
credibility through Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification. Of 
New  Zealand’s 1.8Mha, some 42% is now FSC-certified.
39 Forestry plantation 
profitability is also affected by future investment both directly in forestry 
production and by capital infrastructure building. These aspects are discussed in 
Section 3.3.1 to 3.3.2 below. 
3.3.1 Forestry  infrastructure and processing needs 
Figure 4 illustrates the impacts of different planting scenarios on wood 
availability in later periods and hence implicitly the demand for harvesting and 
processing infrastructure in each scenario. Key questions are: Will our ability to 
harvest, transport and process a much increased wood supply limit the further 
expansion of New Zealand forests? Could we continue to profitably grow forests 
in New Zealand even if we only export logs?  
                                                             
37“New Zealand forest industries log pricing,” accessed on 10 February 2004. 
38 Sutton (1999), p. 8.  
39 New  Zealand Forest Owners Association, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and the 
New Zealand Forest Industries Council (2003), pp. 21. 21 
Figure 4: Effect of different planting rates on wood availability 
 
 
Source: New Zealand Forest Owners Association, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and the 
New Zealand Forest Industries Council (2003). 
 
At harvest, the costs of transporting timber to mills, processing plants 
and ports is significant.
40  New  Zealand has over 400 sawmills, and a dozen 
significant ports for log or chip exports.
41 Road condition is also important, 
especially for commercially marginal growing regions such as the East Coast of 
the North Island. Some forestry companies use a working circle rule of thumb for 
forest planting or acquisition decisions (particularly for pulp and other lower 
                                                             
40 The New Zealand Forest Owners Association, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and the 
New Zealand Forest Industries Council (2003) estimate of the cost to transport 1 cubic metre of 
wood for 1 kilometre is 15–20 cents (p. 25). Loading costs, plus the cost of the initial 10–20 km, 
are the largest cost element. An estimate of fixed costs is $3 per cubic metre, with 11–12 cents per 
cubic metre kilometre on top of that (David Paul, personal communication, May 2003). On 
occasion, harvesting and transport costs mean that growers leave trees standing at maturity rather 
than harvesting. 
 
41 “Exports of logs and wood chips by port September 2003 quarter and September 2003 year 
(provisional),” 2003. 22 
grade products); the "working circle" distance from processing plants is heavily 
influenced by transport costs.  
With around a third of a growing supply of logs now being exported in 
log form, substantially up from the 1980s, port facilities are also increasingly 
significant.
42 Access to adequate facilities, and cost levels, at the major ports 
(Tauranga, Whangarei, Nelson, Napier and Gisborne) are important. As 
infrastructure can have a significant impact on costs, it is important to the industry 
that infrastructure does not constrain industry growth. Roading and the Gisborne 
port are identified by the industry as key areas needing upgrading.  
3.3.2  How are growing and processing of forests linked? 
The majority of wood processing in New Zealand takes place in the 
central North Island. The major forest owners are also the main wood processors, 
with their processing plants located near or within their forests.  
Approximately 70% of the annual pine harvest is processed in 
New  Zealand, with the remaining 30% exported as unprocessed logs.
43 Wood 
supply volumes are expected to reach around 30 million cubic metres by 2010 
and, given current planting rates, we can expect a longer-term supply of around or 
above 40 million cubic metres
 (see Figure 4). In order to process the increasing 
wood supply there is pressure on the forestry industry to both upgrade existing 
facilities and invest in green-field plants. The industry has spent over NZ$1.6 
billion on enhancing capacity over the 10 years to July 2002, and it expects to 
spend a further $445 million over the period 2003–2009.
44  
Because forest growers always have the backstop alternative of 
exporting logs, it is likely that local processing capacity will have only a limited 
impact, if any, on prices received for timber. However, in areas where port 
facilities are congested, an increment in processing capacity could temporarily 
have a modest impact in lifting otherwise sub-marginal log prices.  
                                                             
42 Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (2003b). 
43 Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (2003b). 
44 New  Zealand Forest Owners Association, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and the 
New Zealand Forest Industries Council (2003), p. 18. 23 
Similarly, expected energy costs are unlikely to have any significant 
impact on forest returns, except through the indirect path of influencing 
processing plant investment decisions. A reliable supply of low-cost electricity 
and process heat is an important factor in processing returns, especially for more 
energy-intensive processing. If energy costs rise with climate change regulation, 
gas scarcity, and other factors this is likely to reduce or at least limit the expansion 
of throughput and hence input demand from processing mills, adversely affecting 
forestry returns from sales within New  Zealand and diverting wood to export 
markets. 
In the longer term, if processing infrastructure is better developed in 
New Zealand, allowing a move away from log sales on commodity markets, the 
industry may be better equipped to withstand commodity price fluctuations. 
Domestic timber prices may also become less anchored to international timber log 
export prices. 
3.4 Specific  Māori issues 
Māori have a considerable stake in forest resources: MAF estimates that 
about 240,000ha, or 14% of New Zealand's plantation forests, are on Māori land,
45 
and Māori are estimated to own around 35,000ha of this forest.
46,47 
  Harmsworth’s recent work has found that an estimated 300,000–
400,000ha of Māori land is marginal.
48 Of this marginal land 255,000–345,000ha 
is under indigenous forest or mature scrub, and 40,000–50,000ha is in pasture 
(and was in pasture at 1990).
49  
 
                                                             
45 This was estimated for the year 2000 (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2001).  
46 Figure supplied by Crown Forestry (personal communication). 
47 Harmsworth (2003) estimates that about 12.1% of total Māori land in New  Zealand is in 
plantation forest.  
48 Marginal land has been generally identified as land falling in Land-use capability classes 6–8. 
Land-use capability is an ecological measure that rates land for 1–8 on its ability to sustain 
agriculture, taking into consideration ecological characteristics, climate, and the potential for 
erosion.  
49 Harmsworth (2004). Māori land in Harmsworth (2003) refers to Māori freehold land (from 
Māori Land Court records), which is largely Māori multiple owned land. 24 
  With, as yet, no map of New  Zealand land cover at 1990 it is not 
possible to accurately quantify the amount of Māori land that has an opportunity 
to gain credits for reforestation or regeneration to scrub under Article 3.3 Kyoto 
rules. Clearly, the 40,000–50,000ha in pasture has this potential. Also, a portion of 
the 255,000–345,000ha currently under indigenous forest or mature scrub may 
have been in immature scrub at 1990 and not have met the Kyoto definition of 
forest. However, this portion is likely to be a few percent at most.
50 
  Harmsworth has identified that Kyoto-eligible marginal Māori land is 
likely to be favoured for afforestation into exotics (rather than regeneration to 
scrub) due to the perceived higher economic returns of plantation forest among 
Māori.
51 In the absence of policy to deter deforestation, further Māori land in 
mature non-Kyoto scrub or indigenous forest may also be targeted for clearing 
and reforestation into plantations.
52 
4 Land-use  decision-making 
In this section we discuss the factors affecting land-use decisions by 
New  Zealand landowners (or land-use decision makers acting on behalf of 
owners)—for example, the decision whether to plant a forest or retain land as 
pasture. These influences will vary among groups and across individuals, but there 
are some regularities and common factors affecting decisions, as well as factors 
that may be particularly important for specific groups.  
The essential issues can be set out with a fairly simple standard 
economic model. We then take into account additional factors such as tax, risk, 
social factors and lifestyle choices and discuss who is likely to expand forest land 
and the likely scale of such expansion.  
                                                             
50 Craig Trotter, personal communication, 31 May 2004. 
51 Garth Harmsworth, personal communication, 12 February 2004. 
52 Some district councils place restrictions on the clearing of mature scrub. 25 
Much of the background information supporting the discussion in this 
section has been based on consultations with a variety of industry groups. If a 
source is not explicitly mentioned in the text, the information has been derived 
from these meetings.  
4.1  A simple model  
Simple economic models of land use propose that land-use decisions 
depend primarily on expected returns from competing alternative uses. Consider a 
landowner facing a choice between retaining land in agriculture and converting it 
to forest.
53 This standard model is derived from Stavins and Jaffe (1990), who 
have tested the model in the United States. In their model, the landowner will 
convert agricultural land to forest only in the following circumstances: 
 (F – K – A.q + M ) > 0  
where F is the present value of forest net revenue, taking into account 
delay until harvest; K is the present value of the cost associated with establishing 
and managing a forest (site preparation, planting, pruning etc.), A is the present 
value of the expected future stream of agricultural revenues; q is a parcel-specific 
index of feasibility of agricultural production, including effects of soil quality and 
moisture; and M is the expected cost of agricultural production. Another way of 
viewing this is: 
  qf = [F + M – K]/A 
where qf
 is the threshold value of land quality below which there is an 
incentive to convert to forestry (and above which it stays in agricultural use). We 
create a similar threshold for the distinction between forestry and scrub, qs. Very 
low quality land will not yield a positive return in forest. A possible frequency 
distribution of land types is shown in Figure 5. 
                                                             
53 Another alternative in some contexts is setting it aside for biodiversity protection. However, 
biodiversity protection can be viewed as a special case of (non-harvest) forestry. 26 
If land quality of a particular parcel is below qf, the land will be 
converted to forestry. This threshold qf is represented by a vertical line in the 
diagram below, which has “q”, the land quality index, on the horizontal axis. If 
the land quality is above qf’ it will remain in agricultural uses. The gap between 
them results from the fixed costs of converting from one use to another. In this 
range, the land will stay in its current use. The positions of the thresholds will 
move with changes in output prices, productivity and costs. 
Figure 5: The distribution of land quality, and economic thresholds for 
afforestation and scrub reversion  
 
  qf  Index of feasibility for agriculture, q 
f(q) 
farm  forest  scrub 
qf’  qs  qs’ 
 
Source: After Newell and Stavins, 2000. 
We can expect q (the parcel-specific index of feasibility of agricultural 
production) to be a function of: 
•  soil quality—including soil moisture and factors such as acidity 
•  slope (topography) and erodibility 
•  accessibility  
•  local climate. 
In general, poor soil quality and steep country tends to be converted to 
forestry, sometimes with the assistance of regional councils concerned to 
minimise flooding in vulnerable river catchments.  27 
The net return to forestry, F – K, has various components, principal 
ones being: 
•  the price of logs received by the forester after harvest, at the port or 
processing site 
•  the volume of timber of different grades produced (e.g. pruned logs; 
saw logs; industrial logs) 
•  the cost of planting, growing and harvesting the trees  
•  transport costs (a function of distance and trucking cost structures) to a 
port or processing site.  
Given that forest rotations are so long, a key factor, the price of logs at 
the harvest point, is highly uncertain. While industry participants commonly cite 
current log prices as an indicator of future prices, there is major uncertainty over 
this element of the return; many in the industry note there is no strong reason to 
expect that current log prices will be a good predictor of log prices at the point of 
harvest.  
4.1.1  How much land is marginal for agriculture and could be used for 
forestry? 
PA Consulting have estimated that land suitable for forestry is over 9.4 
million hectares in area, although it is important to note that this is not a 
prediction of actual likely conversion.
54 The Forest Industry Council’s vision for 
planted area by 2025 is 4 million hectares.
55 Given that the current forested area is 
around 1.8 million hectares, under either "scenario", potential conversion of 
farmland to planted forest would be very substantial. At present, it can only be 
said that most industry commentators do not see current  confidence levels as 
sufficient to generate planting rates that would achieve conversion of such large 
areas. 
                                                             
54 PA Consulting Group (2001), Chapter 10, p. 3. 
55 New  Zealand Forest Owners Association, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and the 
New Zealand Forest Industries Council (2003), p. 22. 28 
4.1.2  How much land that is in forestry might not be in future? 
On the other hand, little reconversion is currently taking place. The 
model in Section 4.1 suggests that there needs to be a significant increase in 
returns to farming before conversion from forestry to farming is likely to take 
place—in effect there is a “buffer” damping conversion. This buffer arises partly 
because reconversion involves costs of removing stumps, roots etc., which may be 
around $4000 per hectare. Some industry commentators note a few reconversions 
from forestry to dairy but the land quality (q in the model) has to be exceptionally 
good (perhaps valued at around $12,000 per hectare) to justify such action.
 56  
4.2  Other factors that affect land-use decisions 
Expected returns may explain a significant portion of overall variance 
in land use, but many other factors affect specific decisions and can provide 
additional explanatory power. Different land uses have different risk profiles and 
different agents respond differently to these risks. Tax treatment, particularly of 
forestry, has changed over time. Governance (e.g. government, private, Māori, 
foreign) affects the way the landowner makes decisions. Non-economic factors 
such as environmental and social considerations can also have a significant impact 
on land-use decisions. These could be reflected in individual preferences or in the 
constraints imposed by regulation such as the RMA. 
4.2.1  Risk and uncertainty 
With forestry’s long horizon, uncertainty is greater than in many other 
land uses. Forestry investors need to make an assumption about the price of wood 
20–30 years in advance. Their expectations about profitability may be based on 
historical and current prices. Policy uncertainty is a major factor because policy 
can change considerably over the period of their investment. Although other 
farmers (e.g. sheep and beef farmers) need to make investments that will last long 
periods, their flow of returns begins very quickly, so they are less vulnerable. 
Forestry investors may be more sensitive than other agricultural investors to 
signals about long term future trends in either prices or policy. Where prices or 
policy seem particularly uncertain, decisions may be deferred until more 
                                                             
56 Peter Clark, personal communication, May 2003. 29 
information is available. Some commentators have suggested that forestry 
investors are very sensitive to perceptions of the industry’s future. Thus small 
foresters reacted severely to the Asian crisis even though it did not directly affect 
the market they would be producing for. 
Different investor groups’ attitudes to risk and uncertainty will 
influence forestry investment decisions. Empirically, it is clear that the investment 
behaviour of the different investor groups varies—with little corporate investment 
in forestry over the last five years, while some (diminishing) farmer investment 
has continued. This may in part be because corporates, small investors and 
farmers differ in their risk management strategies, as well as concerns about 
cashflow.  
Larger agents (such as corporates) are likely to be less affected by risk. 
Agents who have diversified activity may also be less affected by forestry risk. In 
particular, farmers investing in forestry often point to the risk diversification 
advantages of forestry—they engage in forestry while maintaining a viable level 
of livestock to spread and manage risk. They can maintain some cashflow in the 
short term while investing for significant expected returns in the longer term. 
Estate planning is another frequently mentioned driver for farm foresters, with 
forests being viewed as an asset to be inherited by the next generation.  
It has been commented that farmers often meet lumpy cashflow 
requirements by selling forest blocks at times of need, something that corporates 
may be less able to do if they need to provide a steady supply of wood input to 
processing plants. Farmers can also spread risk by engaging in joint ventures with 
investment companies.
57 Farmers retain the land in many such ventures, with 
investors contributing capital for planting; at harvest, proceeds are split.  
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4.2.2  Governance: Foreign ownership 
Approximately 50% of New Zealand’s planted forest estate is owned or 
controlled by foreign investors.
58 There are factors involved in foreign investors’ 
decisions that may lead them to make different decisions than local investors. 
Foreign investors tend to be more mobile in their options, and larger in size, than 
local investors. Their interest in the New  Zealand forest industry is largely 
focussed on gaining access to raw materials, thereby securing supply, and will be 
affected by constraints on raw material access internationally. Local decision-
making on land use tends to be influenced by the level of investment interest 
shown by offshore entities; for example, an increase in foreign investment in 
New Zealand forestry would likely increase future forest replanting and planting 
rates.  
4.2.3 Environmental  considerations 
Most farmers are conscious of environmental concerns such as soil 
erosion and the arguments for retiring steeper hill country into forestry. For farm 
foresters in particular, environmental factors  are “high on the list” of 
considerations affecting planting decisions on a particular block of land. While 
their key concern is erosion control—limiting water run-off, especially after heavy 
rain—other location-specific concerns such as protecting a streambed or wetland 
can be important. Farm foresters may respond directly to these environmental 
concerns.  
They might also be affected by regional planning constraints, especially 
where the environmental impact affects a much wider area. Catchment and water 
quality protection is especially significant in some areas, such as surrounding 
North Island lakes, where nitrogen export rates are higher under grass than forests. 
In the case of Lake Taupo, the regional council is moving to vary the regional 
plan to protect water quality. And, as noted above, in drier areas such as 
Canterbury and Nelson, concerns about the impact of forestry in reducing water 
run-off, in the context of heavy demands on water for irrigation, can influence 
regional council regulatory decisions under the Resource Management Act.  
                                                             
58 PA Consulting Group (2001), Chapter 10, p. 5. 31 
These decisions may affect small and large forestry investments 
differently. Hock et al (2001) note the potential social as well as economic 
impacts of forestry in the Mackenzie Basin. They find a definite long-term 
economic benefit of switching from pastoral farming to forestry. However, little 
land has in fact been planted—influenced, it seems, among other things, by the 
fact that larger-scale plantings require notified resource consents, which were not 
granted due to environmental reasons.
59 
The East Coast Forestry Project set up by MAF in 1992 is an example 
where environmental considerations have been implicitly taken into account in the 
creation of a government-aided forestry initiative. It is managed by the MAF 
Forest Management Group and aims to plant at least 60,000ha of commercial 
forest over 28 years on severely eroding and potentially erodible land on the East 
Coast of the North Island. Government grants are available to landholders through 
a tender process, with this financial assistance providing means to offset the 
additional costs and risks associated with afforestation on erodible land.
 60 
4.2.4 Social  considerations 
Changes in land use have implications for the levels and types of 
employment in rural areas. Forestry may employ fewer people per hectare than 
sheep/beef farming, and particularly, may employ few people who live locally. 
Often specialised teams are brought in for specific jobs such as planting, pruning 
or harvesting. The types of people who are employed in forestry may also be 
different than those in dairy or sheep/beef farming. They have different skills and 
often a different "culture". This has impacts on local communities that may or 
may not be welcome. Changes in land use may require in- and out-migration and 
gradual community adjustment. Resistance to forest planting in some areas may 
reflect both reservations about environmental impacts of forestry (e.g. concerns 
about reduced water run-off or the aesthetic impacts of pine plantations) and about 
its social impacts. Some concerns arise because forestry is unfamiliar.
61 These 
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factors can affect decisions directly or through difficulty in obtaining resource 
consents. 
One Forest Research commentator suggests that where one or two 
farmers introduce forestry to an area, other (often older) farmers may over time 
take up planting as familiarity with forestry practice increases.
62 Older farmers 
may have longer time horizons and may plan to provide the forest to their children 
as a bequest. The average age of farmers in an area may be an indicator of 
openness to converting farms or parts of farms to forestry, and the occupational 
change involved.  
4.2.5  Issues on Māori-owned land 
As well as the above considerations, Māori land-use choices are likely 
to be influenced by additional factors including existing governance structures, 
aspirations about land control, non-timber-related economic opportunities (e.g. the 
production of honey and medicines from manuka and kanuka), and biodiversity 
values. Social factors—including concerns about loss of local employment 
opportunities in an area; a desire to keep communities intact; intergenerational 
equity considerations; stewardship of culturally significant areas; and whether 
other possible income sources are compatible with afforestation—can also be 
important.
63 
4.2.6  Timing of adjustment in land use 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 suggest that an increase in relative forestry 
product prices may be followed by increases in new forest planting. But land-use 
change involves investment and is not instantly reversible. Thus we would not 
expect instantaneous responses to changes in prices or costs. Farmers may regard 
price or policy changes as temporary, so may wait to see if they become 
permanent. They may also have short-run cash flow issues that make a rapid 
response difficult.  
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The land conversion process in New  Zealand appears often to be 
"lumpy"—there may be key points in time when a land-use decision needs to be 
made, perhaps for financial or family reasons, and at these times land use has a 
higher probability of changing. Also, the optimal size of a farm for agricultural 
purposes may be rising over time (assuming that a larger operation allows 
economising on farm management overheads). The farmer has various options. 
One is to sell off a block for forestry, and buy a neighbouring pasture block of 
good quality to reach optimal (or at least viable) farm size. Another is to sell off 
the whole farm—either to another farmer (leading again to aggregation) or to 
forestry investor interests. Because of the transaction costs of 
purchase/sale/leasing, the blocks in question are often sizeable—for example, 200 
or 500 hectares. Similarly, conversion out of forestry can only happen at specific 
times—when the forest is harvested—and may occur in large blocks to make 
alternative land uses viable.  
Some landowners may be slow to move to an "optimal" land use. 
Adjustment is costly where new knowledge has to be acquired and, as with the 
adoption of new technology, a change of land ownership associated with 
migration of people with different skills or generational change may sometimes be 
required. A non-forestry example of this is the movement of Waikato dairy 
farmers to Southland, which was associated with the dairy boom in Southland.  
4.3  Who might expand forest area in future? 
The recent pattern of forest planting suggests that larger corporate 
players will retain their current level of forest and are unlikely to expand their 
forest area—unless there are increases in forestry profitability and industry 
confidence. This means that smaller agents are likely to be the key players in 
purely commercial forest expansion in the short term.  
In the longer term, plantation forestry may become an option for a wide 
variety of players as environmental concerns increase, even without active climate 
policy to encourage it. When forests are planted for environmental reasons they 
are likely to be planted on marginal land, and particularly on steep hill slopes and 
riparian areas. 34 
5  Basic carbon ecology  
5.1 Basic  ecology:  How  much carbon in forests 
At the stand level, the carbon stock in a New Zealand plantation forest 
depends primarily on the silvicultural regime of the particular stand. Stands vary 
in the age classes of trees they contain, and the way the stand is managed. 
Relevant factors include: 
•  species used 
•  initial stocking  
•  fertilisation 
•  pruning/thinning regime 
•  rotation length. 
These factors can be affected by forest management but will be 
significant for reporting under Article 3.3 only where they affect Kyoto forests. 
They will have a much bigger impact if New Zealand decides to report under 
Article 3.4, where management of the entire forest estate will be relevant.  
An example of the time profile of the carbon stock for a stand is shown 
below—it includes pruning at age six, eight and nine years, and thinning, to 
waste, at age six and nine years, with log extraction from the site at clearfell, age 
28. This example is not on previously farmed land so may not be directly 
applicable to many of the Kyoto and potential Kyoto forests. Modelling of stand 
carbon stocks for New  Zealand pine plantations is now well established (e.g. 
through Forest Research’s stand management modelling system STANDPAK and 
C_Change module). 35 
 
Figure 6: Carbon in a radiata pine stand  
 
Source: Forest Research (2002). 
A forest combines a large number of different stands of different ages. 
Thus the sequestration pattern in a forest is likely to be much smoother than that 
in a stand.  
5.2  Aggregate carbon sequestration estimates  
MAF estimates carbon sequestration in the New  Zealand plantation 
forest estate on an annual basis, both for the entire forest estate and for forests that 
have been planted since 1990.
64 They also model the variability of aggregate 
projected carbon sequestration under different new land planting rates, with recent 
new planting rates based on the latest NEFD estimates of annual new planting.  
The results for carbon sequestration for only those stands established 
since 1990 show that “the size of the carbon reservoir in these stands collectively 
increases under all scenarios modelled until harvesting begins in 2019. The onset 
of harvesting results in a decline in average stand age (and therefore carbon 
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stored) which can only be compensated for by a high new planting rate.”
65 In 
other words, if New  Zealand does not resume high planting rates (of about 
40,000ha/yr) in the near future, the post-1990 carbon pool will become a net 
source rather than a net sink by the period 2018–2022.  
Our project aims to forecast land-use change and hence new forest 
planting so that we can say what scenarios are likely rather than simply looking at 
the range. We will also model the effect of different policy scenarios on the 
projected levels of aggregate carbon sequestration. 
5.2.1  Stocks of soil carbon 
Stocks of soil carbon are large, but usually change more slowly than 
above-ground biomass, and there are more uncertainties in soil carbon estimation, 
partly associated with spatial variability.
66 Plantation forestry can have 
counteracting effects on soil carbon stocks. First, consistent evidence shows that 
soil carbon stocks fall as land transitions from pasture to pine but the fall in soil 
carbon stocks is estimated to be small in comparison to the gain in above-ground 
carbon stocks. Further soil carbon loss may arise from forest harvest effects.
67 On 
the other hand, afforestation of marginal land can prevent soil carbon being lost in 
erosion events. Also, the accumulation of pine leaf litter on the forest floor (which 
contains carbon) is likely to offset below-ground soil carbon losses over the 
longer term.  
5.3  Risks associated with carbon in plantation forests 
Fire is often seen as a key risk. However, the probability of fire is low 
in New Zealand.
68 Wind is a more significant risk.
69 Other uncontrollable risks 
include storm events such as Cyclone Bola, which had major effects on forests. 
No land user could have totally prevented those risks to forests. If an area of forest 
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is destroyed by wind and consequently cleared, New  Zealand would lose the 
accumulated credits under Kyoto rules.  
In New Zealand forests pests are an important issue, and an adequate 
investment in border biosecurity remains the best defence. However, 
New Zealand already makes a major investment in forest biosecurity on the basis 
of the economic and environmental significance of our forest resources—so that 
even an enhanced awareness of the value of carbon sequestered in forests is 
unlikely to alter the level of that investment.  38 
PART II: Policy design issues 
Having established the basic context for carbon sequestration policies, 
we move on to analysis of policy design issues. We begin by considering the 
potential value of additional sequestration. Is it likely to be large enough to justify 
the costs of designing and implementing a policy to achieve optimal 
sequestration? We then consider issues relating to different types of policy 
approach.  
Section 6 explores the potential impact that including the value of 
carbon sequestration in land-use decisions could have on forest area. Section 7 
discusses types of incentives and reasons why current forest area may be below its 
potential, even excluding any possible carbon policies. Are there opportunities to 
simply improve the efficiency of the forest growing sector and increase forest 
area? This analysis suggests ways in which government might indirectly 
encourage new forest planting by increasing the profitability of the forest sector. 
Section 8 moves on to discuss policies that directly aim to increase sequestration 
by devolving incentives to landowners and/or forest owners. It outlines key issues 
that need to be addressed when developing a policy design to encourage 
sequestration and storage in a pragmatic way.  
6  The potential impact of rewards on carbon 
sequestration 
Here we discuss how including considerations of the value of carbon 
sequestration and storage changes optimal land-use behaviour. This is to provide 
an indication of the maximum that policy could potentially achieve.  
A simple policy of providing annual payments for the additional carbon 
sequestered (possibly in the form of carbon credits that can be held or exchanged 
for cash) and liability for all carbon released at the time of harvesting would 
perfectly internalise the benefits of carbon sequestration. If there were no 
administrative costs this would simply change forest net revenue. The present 
value of net revenue would rise as long as carbon prices are not rising too fast 
relative to the investor’s discount rate (so the carbon payments received while the 39 
stand grows offset the liability on harvest) and/or there is no intention to convert 
the land to non-forest uses (so a higher cost of liability on harvest is always offset 
by higher carbon payments in the next rotation). If there is a risk that net revenue 
could fall, the forest investor can always opt to insure against carbon price 
changes, or provide for the desire to clear land, by holding carbon credits instead 
of taking the cash and bearing the liability to buy credits later. In our simple 
policy investors are never liable for more credits than they earned while the forest 
grew. Thus they can guarantee that they do not lose from the policy.  
The quantity of carbon sequestered will depend on the carbon "yield 
curve" for the land and forest type in question, and this yield curve enables the 
landowner to adjust the land-use decision for the carbon return. One possible 
carbon yield curve for a stand of radiata pine was given in Figure 6. 
With higher levels of forestry profitability, land that would have been 
marginal for forestry will now be profitable and we would expect conversion of 
land from agriculture to forestry. The higher the carbon yield and carbon price, the 
more land will be converted. We would also expect that rotation lengths would 
become longer, so that average carbon stocks are higher, and that in some cases 
land will not be harvested when the net revenue is too low (e.g. land with poor 
access and poor quality timber).  
By comparing the amount of new forest and total carbon sequestered 
during the commitment period when there is no revenue from carbon with the 
amounts sequestered with varying levels of carbon price, we can generate a 
"supply curve" for carbon. This supply curve slopes upward as usual—i.e. as the 
marginal incentive applied increases, the amount of carbon sequestered also rises. 
However, the shape is non-linear: with an increasing price ($ per tonne) the 
supply curve gets increasingly steep, as more and more of the land in an area is 
converted and the quantity of marginally convertible land diminishes. This is a 
curve that the empirical modelling in our wider project is estimating. 
Any real policy will fall short of the optimal reward system because of 
monitoring costs and difficulties, and other compliance costs. In addition, if 
forestry investors do not trust government, they may respond differently to a 40 
revenue stream that comes from a government policy than to one that comes from 
selling a product on the market. Even if the carbon sequestration policy were 
known to be stable for a long time, because international carbon prices are still 
highly uncertain, revenue from the policy would still be very uncertain. Thus 
forestry investors may not respond to it in the same way as to a rise in timber 
prices or a fall in pruning costs, which may be more stable or which they may feel 
they understand better.  
In the perfect world of our model, a carbon sequestration policy is 
unambiguously beneficial to foresters. In the real world, where compliance costs 
are high and carbon prices may be low, there is a risk that the net benefit to 
foresters required to participate could be negative. This legitimate fear 
necessitates careful policy design to maximise benefit and minimise cost. 
6.1  Effects of forestry carbon sequestration policy 
outside of plantations 
The same factor—increased plantation profitability—that leads 
marginal agricultural land to be converted to forests, also creates pressure to 
convert scrub and regenerating native forest land to plantation forest if only 
plantation forests are eligible for credits. In Figure 5, providing a reward for 
carbon sequestered in plantation forest would move qf to the right, leading to 
conversion of farm land to forest, but would also move qs to the left, leading to the 
conversion of scrub to forest. This could have negative implications for overall 
carbon sequestration if it involves deforestation, or if the long-run level of carbon 
sequestration in indigenous forests is higher. This has been a concern of 
environmental groups. In New Zealand this has been partially addressed with a 
Forestry Accord, where plantation forest owners have agreed not to clear reverting 
scrub in order to establish new forests. Another solution is to offer carbon 
sequestration rewards to indigenous forest as well. To a certain extent this is 
already happening through the development of policy to reward permanent (non-
harvest) forests.  
In the New  Zealand context, an important dynamic is the likely 
displacement of other greenhouse gases (ruminant methane and nitrous oxide) due 
to reduction in livestock numbers with conversion from livestock agriculture to 41 
forestry. This is an extra bonus. However, it cannot be assumed that land 
conversion will lead to a proportionate reduction in livestock numbers (with 
associated methane and nitrous oxide reductions), partly because the land that is 
converted will tend to be the lowest quality with low stocking rates. In addition it 
is possible that livestock number reductions in one area may be partially offset by 
increases elsewhere, perhaps through more intensive stocking, so that apparent 
methane/nitrous oxide reductions are partially offset.  
7  Central control versus devolution of 
incentives 
7.1  Value of devolution 
Devolving credit for sequestration allows market processes to discover 
the lowest cost opportunities for carbon sequestration, and will lead to a higher 
overall level of sequestration for any given "reward" level, i.e. for any given level 
of funding of rewards for carbon. Devolving credit will increase the supply by 
lowering the marginal cost of New Zealand standing timber relative to that from 
developing countries unless they manage to claim credits through the CDM. In 
theory they can claim such credits from 2000 forward. In reality, the costs of 
setting up and carrying out CDM projects is likely to be high, depending on the 
stringency of assessment of baselines, additionality etc. CDM use for forestry may 
thus be relatively limited. 
Devolving credit has two components. Devolving credit for changes in 
behaviour from here on, avoiding deforesting existing forest or planting new 
forest, has real incentive effects that will alter the overall levels of sequestration 
and storage. Devolving credit for behaviour before now (e.g. planting Kyoto 
forests during the 1990s) has large distributional and equity implications but 
probably does not have major efficiency implications. Here we focus on 
devolution of responsibility for future behaviour. We assume that devolution 
implies that Kyoto forest owners gain all credits for sequestration from here on 
together with liability for carbon released during harvesting, and that all forest 
owners bear full liability for deforestation (change to a non-forest land use). Thus 
foresters gain the full carbon benefit of their actions from now on and bear the full 42 
costs. We do not advocate this as the ideal system, but we need to have a system 
in mind as we assess other aspects of policy. Later in this part we discuss possible 
alterations to this system and some of their benefits and disadvantages. 
A devolved credit system lowers the marginal opportunity cost of 
planting or replanting a forest for both Kyoto and non-Kyoto forests. If a non-
Kyoto forest owner were considering converting a hectare rather than replanting, 
in a fully devolved system he would have to bear the liability for deforestation. 
This makes replanting more attractive. This does not mean that the non-Kyoto 
forest owner is better off or faces lower dollar costs of timber production. 
Essentially the liability lowers the return to the forester from conversion to 
agriculture and means that he will continue to produce timber even at a lower 
timber price. The forester’s land is less valuable because it now carries a potential 
liability. This is a loss of asset value. This only has a real effect on his wealth if 
his land is of a type which he would have wanted to convert to agriculture without 
the liability. Land that cannot realistically be used for non-forest purposes is 
unaffected. The non-Kyoto forest owner loses some wealth because he bears the 
potential liability but gains no credit. These are equity issues that need to be 
considered in allocation of credits for historical action or some other form of 
compensation, to make the policy fair and acceptable.  
If a Kyoto forest owner is thinking of converting a hectare away from 
forestry after harvesting, he will take into account the credits he would have 
received as the forest grew back. These lost credits are roughly equal to the 
deforestation liability, so in the same way as for non-Kyoto forest owners, they 
make replanting more profitable relative to agriculture. For both, this lowers the 
cost of continuing forestry relative to other options. The land is more valuable in 
forestry than in other uses.  
This increased incentive to produce standing timber does not mean that 
processed timber costs fall with comprehensive climate regulation—overall 
effects on costs are indeterminate because the lower supply cost of timber will be 
offset to an unknown extent by a rise in cost of the fossil-fuel energy use involved 
in transportation and processing. 43 
7.2 Direct  interventions by government 
It is unlikely that government can send an effective price signal to 
efficiently reward sequestration and deter deforestation if it maintains control of 
all credit revenue. Nevertheless, there are some "central control" policy options 
available to the government that do not entail devolving incentives directly to 
foresters. 
The government can influence sequestration by, for example, improving 
infrastructure, providing information to facilitate forestry, or adjusting the tax 
regime.
70 Central government could strengthen incentives or provide resources for 
local government to improve planning and consent performance, and use policy 
statements or plans under the RMA to influence local land use towards forestry 
where appropriate. Some of these may be relatively crude poorly targeted 
instruments. Much of their effect may be to simply improve returns on existing 
forestry investments without any behavioural change. This general policy domain 
is where FIFA is pitched. Some of those policies—for example those oriented 
more towards wood processing—may not be the most cost-effective means of 
optimising planting. They may act more as a mechanism for compensation/gain 
sharing in the context of the government claiming the vast majority of the carbon 
sequestration credits.  They should be assessed as such.  
If existing problems limit the forest-growing sector now, policies that 
address these problems could increase simple economic efficiency while also 
having carbon sequestration benefits. Policies to address non-carbon-related issues 
are likely to be those discussed above. Using them for carbon as well would 
simply be expanding their use beyond the otherwise optimal level. How effective 
this would be in inducing sequestration is a key question. 
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7.2.1  Public infrastructure: Roads, ports 
Road transport costs have a significant influence on planting decisions. 
Aside from privately financed forestry roads, investment in relevant roads is 
largely the responsibility of local government, and appropriately so, as the 
benefits accrue mainly locally. National benefits flowing from regional 
development and services to downstream industries not in the area also justify a 
central government contribution. A similar argument applies to ports, which in 
some cases are substitutes for roads (although in most cases they are 
complementary). Moreover, benefits accrue not just to forestry investors but also 
to the wider community, including farmers and other rural producers and town 
populations. The critical policy question is the optimal level, location and timing 
of road and port investment, taking into account the overall benefit to 
New  Zealand from enhanced carbon sequestration and the need to signal to 
forestry investors that planting decisions will be complemented by appropriately 
timed and located future investment in roads. The desire to encourage carbon 
sequestration might lead to slightly faster or more extensive road and port 
development. 
7.2.2 Information   
The discussion in Section 4.2 noted a fairly common pattern in 
New  Zealand in which forestry takes time to "catch on" among farmers and 
investors in some areas. This suggests both that social patterns, such as farmer age 
and social/aesthetic preferences, are significant in influencing the spread of 
forestry, and also that there may sometimes be an information gap—a lack of 
local models and information sources—in some localities. This might justify 
coordinated provision of information on the costs and benefits of forestry simply 
to reach optimal levels of forest in the absence of carbon policy. This could be of 
value even without devolved credits.  
If credits are devolved, provision of high quality information to 
landowners about carbon sequestration calculation, possible future returns from 
carbon credits (beyond 2012), the range of land-use choices that can increase 
carbon sequestration, land capability, climatic variability, etc. may complement 
the incentives provided by credit devolution. There is a case for such information 45 
provision to be funded by central government and provided through regional 
councils or commercial providers. Examples of government supported 
commercial provision of this sort of information have emerged recently, e.g. 
Topoclimate-South. 
An expansion in forest planting also increases the demand for people 
with the skills associated with planting, managing and harvesting forestry. 
Government has an important role here as the major education provider.  
7.2.3 Regulatory  barriers—e.g.  RMA 
Local authorities will always have to take into account distinctive local 
environmental and other conditions in their policies, plans and resource consent 
decisions. Unnecessary local variation in policies and practice under the RMA 
may, however, be minimised by better coordination and information sharing. 
Timeliness of decision-making is also an issue that needs to be addressed.  Local 
authority staff may need better training.  Stronger, more consistent performance of 
local authorities is likely to require encouragement and resources from central 
government. More consistent approaches and performance across local authorities 
are likely to most assist corporates operating in a number of regions and districts, 
and is less likely to be important to farm forestry investors.  
8  Design and policy evaluation issues for 
devolved policies 
8.1  Compliance costs: Monitoring  
Administrative compliance costs are a key issue in policy design. 
Monitoring both land use and carbon and tracking large numbers of agents could 
be costly both to government and the agents themselves. Many small landowners 
are likely to have an aversion to dealing with government agencies concerning 
issues of land use and may fear a "slippery slope" of compliance requirements if 
they engage with government. They fear that any benefits they gain from a policy 
may be swamped by the administrative costs of compliance.  
There will be tradeoffs between accuracy in assessing sequestered 
carbon with comprehensive coverage on the one hand and costs of administering 46 
the regulation on the other. Strategic choice of the point of assessment, use of 
existing information (such as forest inventories), use of models, and voluntary 
participation of small players could reduce administrative/compliance costs with 
relatively small efficiency costs. Given perceptions among some landowners, 
limiting engagement to a voluntary basis may also be the only feasible course in 
the short term.  
8.1.1  How accurate should monitoring be? 
The basis for environmental integrity is accurate measurement of the 
carbon stored or added to sinks. Monitoring is a requirement of credit creation and 
maintenance because otherwise compliance cannot be established. Because sinks 
can be destroyed, monitoring must be ongoing, though it need not be frequent. As 
long as no carbon release occurs and monitoring continues, the credits would 
remain valid.  
At a global scale what is important is that measurement is unbiased so 
that the amount credited globally is accurate. Large errors in specific places are 
not important as long as they go in both directions and do not lead to global bias 
and too many (or too few) credits being created. Overall bias will lead 
atmospheric concentrations to be different from those envisaged in the Kyoto 
agreement.  
Ensuring fairness across countries requires more accurate measurement 
so that each country's total sink credits accurately reflect the real sinks created. 
Again, as long as the national total is accurate, it does not matter to other countries 
if the methodology used to generate this is not accurate for each specific area 
within a particular country. Current inventory methodologies are designed in this 
way. Errors are made but they average out over large areas so the national total is 
reasonably accurate. These inventories are currently taken using a combination of 
remotely sensed and aerial imagery, plot sampling, and models of carbon 
accumulation with limited differentiation of carbon storage across space.  
The problem becomes more challenging if we want to measure carbon 
more accurately at a local level. Simply put, the smaller the area where we require 
accuracy, the more costly and difficult it is. The gains from accurate measurement 47 
are obvious: more equity across landowners and more accurately focused 
incentives to enhance carbon stocks. The costs of more accurate measurement are 
higher costs of monitoring and compliance. These have to be traded off against 
each other. When the carbon price is relatively low, the compliance costs are 
likely to dominate and less accurate methods are probably preferred. As carbon 
prices rise, more accurate methods will become worthwhile.
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Figure 7: More accurate monitoring is justified by a higher price on carbon 
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8.1.2  Who monitors and how? 
One monitoring option, the lowest-cost one, would be for government 
to combine remotely-sensed maps of land use and cadastral maps of property 
boundaries to determine changes in land use and then use their carbon models, 
based on a random sample of audited sites, to estimate net carbon sequestration. 
This would be consistent with national-level reporting, and would be relatively 
unbiased. The disadvantage would be that it would be quite inaccurate, 
particularly for small areas and areas with unusual sequestration patterns (e.g. if 
the land is extremely fertile or the landowner has enhanced the forest).  
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A way to address this would be to allow landowners to choose to have 
their carbon levels audited if they think it will provide a higher payment. They 
could then trade off the cost of the audit against the value of extra payments. 
Accepting audited estimates from landowners would, however, create a bias in 
total carbon credits claimed nationally because only those who have higher than 
average modelled sequestration would opt to provide alternative figures. Those 
with lower than average sequestration would stay silent. Therefore, those who 
opted to provide their own estimates would always claim more credits than the 
government would have given them. The average credits provided on all other 
land may need to be adjusted downward to keep the domestic total and the 
internationally reported totals consistent. Land where landowners did not opt to 
provide their own carbon sequestration numbers will tend to be lower carbon 
producing land, but might also include small land parcels. Owners of small 
parcels will not choose to provide alternative figures because the cost would 
outweigh any gains. Thus this system would create some inequity for such small 
parcel owners.  
A second monitoring option would be for landowners to report their 
own changes in land use. This could be randomly audited with remote sensing or 
ground-truthing. If the total were inconsistent with the national-level reporting, 
adjustments could be made to all domestic credits (e.g. increasing or decreasing 
the quantity to account for bias). These reports of land-use change could be 
translated into sequestration using government models, or landowners could pay 
for more accurate, certified audits if they chose.  
8.1.3  Point of assessment 
The "point of assessment" to account for carbon stock changes 
(sequestration or emissions associated with harvesting) could be either the land 
user (forest owner) or the landowner. The appropriate choice may well be 
different for indigenous forest (not covered here) than for plantation forest and 
may vary by block size. As far as possible it is desirable that the assessment 
includes those people/legal entities that jointly cover all sequestration and 
deforestation (i.e. all forest and potential forest) in New Zealand and can influence 
sequestration on the land, either directly or through contracts with the land user. 49 
At the same time it will be important to minimise the number of agents required to 
report, and choose those who can report with least cost (possibly because they 
already collect inventory information).  
The current land user (e.g. a forest concession holder, or "forest 
owner") usually has substantive control of land-use choices in the short run, but it 
may be difficult to track users through time as contracts change. They may also 
have limited long-term control of the land or their control may be contractually 
limited to a finite period of land use. Landowners have control of land use in the 
long term as their existing contracts with land users roll over.  
Wherever the point of assessment is placed, positive carbon price 
signals encouraging more planting and more use of sustainably harvested wood 
will be passed up and down the supply chain. This may be hindered by high 
transaction costs in some cases. A more comprehensive system with a greater 
percentage of the assessment obligation placed on those who control land use will 
lead to more efficient price signals.
72 Because of the long-term nature of forestry, 
liability of deforestation depends on past actions and contracts. The choice of the 
point of assessment could have significant distributional effects.  
8.1.4  Reporting costs and cash flow 
There may be a trade-off between cash flow and reporting costs. Any 
sink credits need to be verified at regular intervals, but these intervals need not be 
short. Verification could involve varying degrees of accuracy. It may be that only 
the existence of the forest is monitored in some periods, rather than auditing the 
carbon content of those forests. For example, it may be adequate to verify initial 
establishment of a block and then only monitor in 5 and 15 years time, and verify 
the time of harvest if it is claimed to be surprisingly late. The need to monitor 
between planting and harvest depends on the incentives for early harvest—for 
some forests there may be strong commercial reasons not to harvest before the 
trees mature. 
                                                             
72 This can be compared with the case of fossil CO2 emissions where many potential alternative 
points of assessment/obligation are available: fossil fuel importers and producers, large energy 
users, consumers of energy-intensive products, or consumers of retail gasoline. This is because 
fossil-fuel use is a near-perfect proxy for CO2 emissions.   50 
It is also not necessary that monitoring occur every time a payment is 
made. Land users could be asked to report only if their level of forest falls 
between periods of formal monitoring. Payments could then be based on previous 
information combined with these self-reports. This would minimise compliance 
costs while putting a small amount of enforcement risk on government.  
8.2 Liability 
Either the government or the land user can bear the liability for 
deforestation. If the government bears the liability, the government is essentially 
"renting" the credits from the landowner and must give them back when the land 
is cleared (the land user then uses the returned credits to meet the liability).
73 As 
in any rental contract, the price paid will be a fraction of the capital value of the 
credits (e.g. as with a residential rental). The value the government should pay the 
landowner and hence land user depends on how the government thinks their 
liability for repayment is changing over time. (To continue the residential rental 
analogy it is as though when they stop renting they are forced to buy.) If they 
expect that carbon credit prices will fall in future, the government will be willing 
to pay a higher rental because they think the extra liability they are taking on is 
smaller. If in contrast they think credit prices might rise, they will want to pay a 
low rental and may simply prefer to back out of the contract and its associated 
payments unless the land user is willing to bear or share the liability.  
Landowners may want to retain the ability to change their mind about 
their land use. A permanent commitment to a carbon sink/reservoir is a severe 
land-use limitation: forever is a long time. If crop prices or technology changes so 
that profitable alternative land-use options emerge, or if the cultural values of 
successive owners have a different emphasis, the landowner might desire to 
change the land use. They may want this to be possible without breaching a 
contract or making a large cash payment.  
                                                             
73 For discussion of the value of different contract forms see Kerr (2003). 51 
There are also issues about trust. If the government is unable to commit 
to a long-term policy, land users might fear that they will be held liable for 
deforestation in the long term even if that were not in the current agreement. They 
may also fear that the government will stop making or reduce payments when they 
have already committed to a project and are unable to back out. These perceptions 
of regulatory risk would affect the optimal policy design.  
A credit in the form of a tax break aimed at land users who sequester 
carbon is unlikely to impose any liability on the land user. Thus it is similar to a 
rental payment. The levels of payment to the land user should therefore be similar 
to the rental payments. A tax policy may also create different perceptions about 
the stability of government policies. It is an instrument that governments have, in 
recent years at least, been cautious about using or varying, so this might create a 
more positive perception. It is not clear that it would reduce the probability that 
the government would decide to impose liability at a later date, however. 
8.2.1  Cash flow and liability 
Different policies have different cash flow implications for land users 
and also impose different risks. Carbon sequestration is inherently risky because it 
is reversible. Liability for deforestation imposes risk because carbon prices and 
returns to competing non-forest land uses are uncertain and affect both the 
probability of incurring the liability and the cost of it if it is incurred. Even while 
making policy consistent with New  Zealand’s international commitments (i.e. 
rewarding only for net sequestration within each commitment period) there are 
options for meeting different concerns about cash flow and allocation of the risks 
and costs that arise from liability for deforestation.  
A series of policies have the same overall present value if both land 
user and government have the same concerns about the timing of cash flow (i.e. 
same discount rate) and about risk. When these conditions do not hold, the policy 
choice is critical. Essentially there are tradeoffs between the level of cash flow to 
land users and both the risk they bear and the overall expected value of the carbon 
rewards on a given piece of land.  52 
8.2.2  Timing of payments, risk bearing and liability 
In any policy, the earlier the payments are made, the lower the total 
nominal value of the payments should be. The land user prefers to have their 
money up front.  The government prefers not make payments earlier. If the land 
user has a higher discount rate than government, however, it might be better 
overall for the land user to get the money early and accept that in exchange the 
total nominal amount the government has to pay out is lower.  
A policy where payments up front are greater than the value of credits 
already created can lead to an enforcement issue. If government pays for credits 
and they are not created, they have to get money or credits back from the land 
user. Enforcement relies on deterrence and legal action. In contrast, if payments 
occur only as carbon is sequestered and monitored, enforcement is largely by 
prevention—no payments occur if no carbon is sequestered. Liability would still 
need to be enforced if the land user bears it. A rental contract imposes the most 
liability risk on the government but avoids nearly all enforcement problems.  
The contract form chosen has implications for the risks land users and 
government bear. The "rental" policy imposes all the deforestation liability risk on 
the government. The government will need to be compensated by having to make 
lower payments overall.  
If government chooses to bear all the liability, they can charge for this 
risk bearing only on the basis of observable characteristics. Some land users might 
feel that because they can control the deforestation liability to a certain extent, for 
example because they have cultural or personal environmental reasons for 
protecting forest more than others, they prefer a higher payment in exchange for 
bearing liability. Unfortunately if two contracts were offered—one in which 
government bears the liability and one where the landowner bears it—the highest 
risk landowners would choose the first contract and the government might be left 
with only the risky part of the portfolio. This would have to be anticipated and 
would affect the generosity of the contract they could offer. 53 
8.3 Effects  of  making  participation voluntary 
One option to reduce monitoring costs and avoid the risk that some 
participants in the programme lose would be to make the system voluntary or, 
alternatively, make it compulsory for large landowners or land users but voluntary 
for smaller ones. Government would maintain the residual rights and obligations. 
This approach is commonly used in pollution control where there are some large 
sources and then a large number of very small sources. Rules are set for opt-in to 
the system. Landowners or land users who choose to include their pieces of land 
would need to meet monitoring requirements. They would be able to claim credits 
and would also be liable for emissions from deforestation.  
A baseline level of storage and sequestration would need to be 
established—this could be as simple as the levels of carbon in existing forests 
(possibly proxied for by the age class and planting density) and the area of forest 
at a given date. Baseline deforestation liability would either need to be generous 
enough (e.g. not hold them fully liable for harvesting/deforestation of existing 
forest) that it does not deter entry, or compulsory on all landowners or land users 
so that it did not affect the economics of their choice about whether to participate 
in the credit programme.
74  
If involvement in the domestic program was voluntary and monitoring 
stopped on a piece of land for any reason, for example the carbon price dropped 
and the sequestration wasn't worth continuing, the buyer would have to pay all net 
accrued credits back because their permanence could not be guaranteed.  
8.3.1  Bias in outcomes 
Voluntary participation by small players reduces compliance costs and 
encourages broadening of the system but also creates bias because opting in is a 
strategic act. Those who opt in will tend to be those who expect to gain from the 
system.
75 For example, people who know they have already done actions that will 
lead to sequestration that goes beyond their baseline will want to participate to 
                                                             
74 The programme must ensure that there are no incentives to clear existing forest and plant new 
forest to claim credits. This is discussed below under in Section 8.3.2.. 
75 Opt-in was allowed in the US Acid Rain program for controlling SO2 emissions from electric 
utilities. Montero (1999) discusses the effect this had on environmental outcomes.  54 
gain this windfall. If the monitoring system is simple, for example gives the same 
carbon credits per hectare on good and poor land even though the good land really 
yields more, a farmer on poor land is more likely to opt in than a farmer on good 
land because the agricultural returns on the poor land are artificially low relative 
to the carbon return. Thus the sequestration that is rewarded is likely to be greater 
than the actual additional sequestration. This is a risk for government, as it still 
needs to meet its national targets.  
A system that allows opt-out creates additional complexity. Allowing 
opt-out can exacerbate the bias problem, particularly if land users can anticipate 
whether they will benefit from staying in. They might simply opt in for years 
where it is advantageous and opt out for bad years.  
8.3.2 Leakage 
Leakage arises when sequestration in one project is offset by increased 
deforestation in another area that is not included in the programme. If, for 
example, there was a fixed amount of investment for forest planting in 
New Zealand and there were rewards for planting new areas but no liability for 
deforestation, some resources would be redirected from replanting on existing 
forest area toward planting new forests. Deforestation liabilities are much higher 
than the new sequestration on new forests because almost the entire carbon stock 
is lost in one period with deforestation, while growth happens gradually. If land 
users are offered credits for new forests but face no liability for existing forests, 
leakage could be extremely costly. In the extreme, negative additional 
sequestration would result and the government would simply be giving away 
resources.  
The only way to avoid leakage completely is to have a comprehensive 
compulsory system (or no system at all). The likely scale of leakage depends 
partly on the elasticity of forestry investment. To what extent would a credit 
system for new planting lead to higher overall levels of forestry investment? It 
also depends on how easily new land can be substituted for existing forest land. 
Will investment in new forests crowd out investment in replanting? These are 
partly empirical questions. Some types of land might be more responsive than 
others, as might be some types of investors.  55 
8.4 Risks  arising  from economic factors 
The economic risks in a devolved carbon sequestration system have two 
sources: the returns for any carbon credits earned and the costs of creating and 
maintaining the resource that earns the credit. On the return side, the carbon price, 
the possibility of price differentiation, and risks around whether the Kyoto 
Protocol will come into force are key sources of uncertainty. Current price 
estimates range anywhere from NZ$0.55 per tonne of CO2 to over NZ$55 for the 
first commitment period (with recent prices appearing to gravitate to around 
NZ$10).
76 These prices affect the value of sink credits directly. Interest rates and 
expectations about changes in prices affect the value now of future carbon credits, 
or promissory notes for credits. This uncertainty is likely to fall gradually as 2008 
comes closer and more dramatically after 2008, when a real market is operating.  
There is some risk of price differentiation among carbon units, to the 
disadvantage of RMUs. The Marrakesh accords state that all RMUs from LUCF 
activities are in principle fully fungible (exchangeable) with ERUs from Joint 
Implementation projects, CERs from the Clean Development Mechanism, and 
AAUs, all being measured in terms of tonnes of CO2-equivalent. But already, 
RMUs are distinguished from other units by not being "bankable",
77 and it is 
possible that European countries will discriminate against RMUs in their emission 
unit purchasing preferences and even the rules for their trading programme.  
On the cost side, the largest cost is often that relating to the use of the 
land itself. If there is no viable alternative land use, the economic cost of using the 
land is zero. If some new opportunity arises, however, or the profitability of 
existing alternatives rises, the project cost rises correspondingly. This is a key 
source of economic uncertainty. From a risk viewpoint, the issue is the 
landowner’s possible future desire to change the use of land away from forestry 
after harvest, in which case the landowner may face a deforestation liability.  
Luckily the liability risk and the risk that people will desire to change 
land use because of carbon price changes are likely to be negatively correlated, so 
                                                             
76 “Landfill gas scheme wins carbon credits” (2004). 
77 Page (2002), p. 5.  56 
the overall risk is less than it appears at first sight as long as land users have the 
ability to deforest and either stop receiving credit (a "rental" contract) or pay the 
deforestation liability. If the land user wants to change land use because returns to 
alternative uses have risen or returns to forestry have fallen, they may bear a 
higher liability if credit prices happen to be high. If credit prices are too high, the 
land user will choose not to make the change. If the return to the alternative use is 
very high, the liability may not seem so important. Land users will be least likely 
to clear their land and therefore have make payments for deforestation liability at 
the time when those payments would be very high.  
When credit prices are low, and hence the return to maintaining the 
forest is low relative to the return to other uses, so land users want to change land 
use, liability is also low and land users face relatively little penalty.  
In the case where forestry returns fall, if the land is not valuable for 
other uses, there is no liability; even if forestry activities cease, indigenous 
reversion is likely to occur, so there is no "deforestation". If, however, forestry has 
become very unprofitable and reversion to pasture is just possible, the liability 
might seem an extra burden in an already bad situation.  
A contract that requires permanent storage in a fixed piece of forest 
imposes more risk on land users because it restricts their responses to economic 
conditions. They risk losing valuable alternative returns. 
8.5 Baseline—i.e.  what  are  rewards provided relative to? 
The international rules set one baseline—all credits from post-1990 
forests belong to New  Zealand. All liability from deforestation is borne by 
New Zealand. The domestic baseline does not need to be the same. The internal 
allocation of credits within New  Zealand has no environmental impact—total 
international credits and hence total net emissions will be the same however they 
are allocated domestically.  57 
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Figure 8 breaks the total amount of carbon credits into three stocks. The total of 
stocks 1 and 2 is estimated at around 100m tonnes CO2. Within the lowest stock, 
Stock 1, the issue is simply about who should benefit from this windfall gain to 
New Zealand. We do not discuss this here. Within Stock 2, the equity issues are 
complex because landowners may have planted forest in response to expectations 
about Kyoto and might feel they have a strong argument for being rewarded even 
though there are no direct incentive effects from allocating credits to them. For 
Stock 3 there are clear efficiency arguments. Against both equity and efficiency 
criteria, Stock 3 credits should belong to those who control the land. The greatest 
challenge is to identify where the line falls between Stocks 2 and 3. We discuss 
the issues relating to ownership of Stocks 2 and 3 below.  
8.6  Stock 2—rewards for early action 
Some landowners and forest owners might have in good faith invested 
in forests with the idea that they will contribute not only profit but also carbon 
sequestration, which will have environmental benefits. This was relatively 
unlikely in 1990 but became more likely in more recent years. It is hard to 
separate Stocks 1 and 2, but errors have primarily distributional implications. If 
the government wants to reward this essentially altruistic (or optimistic) behaviour 
to encourage these people to do more in future, it could find it compelling to give 58 
them some share of credits even if that share is based on historical activities. 
There are no direct efficiency effects here. There may be indirect incentive effects 
through building trust that government will at lease partially reward those who 
create benefit for New Zealand.  
8.7  Stock 3—ownership of "additional" carbon credits. 
Even if government were to claim ownership for Stocks 1 and 2, this 
does not mean that they should claim all credits. In particular, if land or forest 
owners create additional forests they should be rewarded for this by receiving any 
extra credits. The regulation should be designed to reward any activities that 
sequester carbon and that would not have happened otherwise. We would expect 
that with this regulatory system more forests would be planted. Ownership of 
these credits is an efficiency issue central to regulatory design. 
The real gain for New  Zealand from here on will come if land and 
forest owners plant and protect more forest than they would have without Kyoto. 
Forest areas may be expanding anyway but if they expand even more because of 
appropriate incentives, that will bring extra gains to New Zealand. The additional 
gain to New Zealand only comes from landowners and forest owners doing things 
from now to 2012 (and possibly into later commitment periods) that they wouldn't 
have done otherwise. The ideal system would ensure that the person making 
decisions about forestry faces the same reward (incentive) as New Zealand as a 
whole. 
If the government is to claim Stocks 1 and 2, it must face the difficult 
problem of setting a baseline that will encourage additional carbon sequestration 
but not reward sequestration that would have happened anyway. If the baseline is 
set too low, land and/or forest owners will receive a windfall and be rewarded for 
actions they have already taken and the government loses potential revenue.  
In contrast, if the baseline is set too high, people could actively protect 
and regenerate forest and receive no reward. This would decrease their incentive 
to do so and demotivate those acting from a mixture of good will and self interest. 
An opportunity for an efficient reduction in greenhouse gas concentrations would 
be lost.  59 
With plantation forests, once they are planted they are unlikely to be 
harvested before maturity, so we can predict sequestration between 2008 and 2012 
fairly accurately. New forests planted between now and 2012 will have a low 
sequestration rate during the period—so new forests will not be large contributors. 
A baseline where forests planted after 2000 (as opposed to 1990) are rewarded 
would be one approximation to a baseline that only rewards additional 
sequestration. It would create relatively small windfall gains and be unlikely to 
lead to any perverse incentive problems. As long as forests planted in the 1990s 
never face a liability greater than the credits they receive during the commitment 
period, owners will have no perverse incentive to harvest before 2008. As this is 
guaranteed at the international level, it should be incorporated in a domestic 
system as well. 
In no case does the setting of the domestic baseline affect international 
greenhouse gas environmental integrity. The international rules that define the 
carbon credits New Zealand receives are fixed. On the other hand, if New Zealand 
adopts policies that are seen to effectively increase sequestration in line with the 
intent of the UNFCCC, this will enhance New  Zealand’s reputation and 
bargaining position for the second commitment period. 
9  Key empirical issues raised 
This paper has summarised the current state of policy and the forestry 
industry. It has also canvassed the range of policy questions that must be 
addressed to design an effective carbon sequestration policy for plantation forests. 
It has deliberately not provided even a straw man for a potential policy. Instead it 
has identified a number of key areas where we need more information before we 
can make well-informed choices about policy design. Some of these choices 
involve political judgements (e.g. the appropriate allocation of credits for 
historical action). Some choices will be affected by our existing institutions or 
scientific knowledge (e.g. monitoring and allowing for voluntary participation of 
some groups). Another group of choices is of particular interest to Motu because 
policy makers need empirical information on economic factors and human 
behaviour to make good choices. The following questions are central: 60 
1.  Who owns New Zealand forests and the land under them? 
2.  How much new forest has been planted since 1990, who planted it and 
who owns it? 
3.  How much new forest is likely to be planted without incentives? 
4.  How much would price incentives affect forest planting? 
5.  How large are New Zealand’s deforestation liabilities likely to be? 
6.  Who is likely to deforest existing forest? Why? How might they be 
influenced by price incentives? 
7.  How will policies affecting the forest processing sector influence 
plantations? 
8.  What non-price factors drive new planting and responses to incentives? 
How important are these, and where are they most important? 
9.  What social effects is any potential policy likely to have? 
10.  What non-climate environmental effects is any policy likely to have? 
11.  How can price-based policies be designed most effectively? 
12.  How can price-based policies be effectively complemented by non-
price policies? 
This paper has been a first step in clarifying the questions and providing 
basic information to start answering them.  Motu and others, particularly Landcare 
Research and Forest Research, have ongoing research programmes to address 
these questions. See 
•  www.motu.org.nz/land_use_nz.htm 
•  www.landcareresearch.co.nz/research/greenhouse/index_800x600.asp 
•  "climate change and energy" under research at 
www.forestresearch.cri.nz. 61 
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Acronyms 
Acronym Page  first 
mentione
d 
Definition from text—note missing definitions, changes, 
and corrections (definition must always precede first use 
of acronym). Example: Human resources (HR) 
AAU  13  Assigned amount unit 
CDM  13  Clean Development Mechanism 
CER  13  Certified emission reduction 
ERU  13  Emission reduction unit 
FIFA  14  Forestry Industry Framework Agreement 
FSC  27  Forest Stewardship Council 
LUCF  13  Land-use change and forestry 
MAF  21  Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
NEFD  19  National Exotic Forest Description 
NGA  15  Negotiated Greenhouse Agreement 
RMA 17  Resource  Management  Act 
RMU 13  Removal  unit 
UNFCC  9  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
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Motu Economic and Public Policy Research  
  
  Motu Economic and Public Policy is a non-profit Research Institute (Charitable Trust) 
that has been registered since 1 September 2000. The Trust aims to promote well-informed and 
reasoned debate on public policy issues relevant to New Zealand decision making. Motu is 
independent and does not advocate an expressed ideology or political position.  
  Motu aims to enhance the economic research and policy environment in New Zealand 
by carrying out high quality independent research, teaching through universities and other 
institutions, training junior research staff, facilitating networks of researchers, hosting foreign 
researchers and organising small conferences and dialogue groups. It is our belief that objective 
research and analysis is a critical foundation for making informed policy decisions and we are 
committed to wide dissemination of our work.  
  Motu's primary strength lies in its people. All of our principal researchers have PhDs 
in economics from top international universities as well as extensive public policy-related work 
experience. Our distinctive contribution is an emphasis on sound empirical analysis, supported by 
our expertise in and knowledge of economic theory and institutional design. We choose research 
areas that build on the interests and expertise of our principal researchers. Our current priorities are 
in the areas of environmental regulation, labour and social policy, and macroeconomics. 
  We maintain strong links with a large pool of internationally renowned experts in our 
chosen fields. These international linkages are critical to our success, and one of our major 
contributions to New Zealand.  
  Our research funding is primarily in the form of research grants. We see this as a 
means of maintaining our commitment to the quality and objectivity of our research. We are able 
to compete internationally for such funding because of the calibre of our principal researchers and 
because of international fascination with the New Zealand reforms. Some of our funding comes 
from foreign foundations and governments. This serves not only to expand the available pool of 
research on New Zealand policy issues, but also to stimulate wider interest in these issues. We also 
seek unrestricted funding from individuals, foundations and corporations to allow us to build a 
stronger research infrastructure within Motu and the wider research community. This allows us to 
actively disseminate ideas, create longer term independent research programs that do not meet 
short-term funding priorities, and organise networks and conferences involving other researchers 
and policy analysts. 
Motu purposes 
1.   Carrying out and facilitating empirical and theoretical research on public policy issues 
relevant to New Zealand; the quality of the research will meet international academic 
standards, suitable for acceptance in reputable academic journals. 
2.  Making existing knowledge more accessible for policy debates in New Zealand; this 
may be done by summarising and critically reviewing existing work on public policy 
issues, or by contributing to and facilitating policy discussions through seminars, 
workshops, and dialogue groups. 
3.  Disseminating the results of our work and knowledge through publication (particularly 
in refereed publications), the internet, conferences, seminars, workshops, dialogue 
groups, and teaching. 
4.  Building New  Zealand capacity to carry out empirical and theoretical research on 
New  Zealand public policy. This will be done through means such as training, 
collaboration, sponsorship of students or researchers and development of 
New Zealand databases.   
5.  Maintaining close links with international experts working on topics related to our 
purpose through communication and collaboration. 
6.  Advancing our work and purpose within New  Zealand by facilitating the visits of 
relevant international visitors. 
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